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SNS-BASED EPARTICIPATION AND CLOUD COMPUTING – A 
CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUES RAISED 
Richard Beales, Steve Taylor, Paul Walland1 
Social Networking Systems provide a significant opportunity for governmental policy-makers 
by allowing them to interact directly with citizens, for example by stimulating new discussions 
or participating in conversations that are already underway so as to gauge public opinion on 
a proposal. Because Social Networks are already widely adopted, they provide potential for a 
much  wider  citizen  base  than  specialist  eParticipation  platforms.  The  WeGov  project  is 
building a software toolkit to help policy-makers make effective use of SNSs by stimulating 
debates,  identifying  hot  and  emerging  topics  and  picking  out  influential  individuals  or 
clusters of sentiment. The data storage and processing requirements of these features are 
significant, and third-party Cloud Computing presented itself as an option to meet them in a 
way that would be affordable to cash-strapped public-sector organisation. However despite 
the popularity of Cloud Computing services in the business IT world, concerns about data 
protection and privacy led us to conclude that political conversations harvested from SNS 
networks could not legally and ethically be entrusted to such services at the current time. This 
paper presents our analysis and offers some recommendations to Cloud Providers that we 
believe must be adopted if the potential of the technology as an economical platform for 
eParticipation is to be realised. 
Introduction 
Enterprise IT providers have aggressively promoted Cloud Computing as a transformative 
technology that lowers the cost of ownership of IT infrastructure while radically improving 
scalability, availability and agility. This is an attractive claim to anyone seeking to implement 
a Social Network System-based eParticipation platform, where typically there is intermittent 
need to harvest and process very large volumes of data.  However eParticipation involves 
collecting politically and socially sensitive personal data; the use of third-party Cloud 
Computing services demands the release of such data to external organisations whose terms 
of service may not be adequate for processing sensitive personal data. In this paper we 
analyse the significant legal and ethical issues that must be addressed if Cloud Computing is 
to be used successfully for eParticipation systems, reflecting decisions we have made in 
WeGov, a collaborative project developing an eParticipation toolkit. And we present a series 
of recommendations that we believe Cloud providers and policy-makers must adopt if the 
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potential of third-party Cloud Computing as an economical platform for eParticipation is to be 
realised. 
SNS-based eParticipation 
For  policy-makers  seeking  to  broaden  the  reach  of  their  eParticipation  activities,  social 
networks like Facebook and Twitter offer an exciting opportunity to engage with a wide cross 
section  of  citizens  on  their  own  turf[1].  These  Social  Network  Systems  (SNSs)  are  used 
enthusiastically  by  young  and  old,  male  and  female,  professional  and  blue-collar  alike. 
However the popularity of SNSs brings its own challenge to any organisation wishing to use 
them for mass political consultation or dialogue; effectively managing discussions involving 
hundreds or even thousands of citizens, and then analysing them to understand the opinions 
and sentiments expressed, requires the support of specialist software tools. Commercial SNS 
analytics  packages  like  Radian  6,  Crimson  Hexagon  and  Mutual  Mind  are  used  by  the 
marketing industry to promote brands, track customer opinion, and identify customers who 
have had negative product experiences or who are early adopters that might trial new products 
or services. Although at least one of these packages, Crimson Hexagon[2], has its roots in 
political  science,  they  are  all  targeted  squarely  at  advertising  agencies  and  corporate 
marketing and publicity departments. The WeGov project is now developing an equivalent 
software toolkit for policy-makers, aiming to provide a manageable user interface through 
which policy-makers can seed, participate in and analyse policy discussion on multiple social 
networking platforms. The WeGov toolkit will allow policy-makers to initiate and follow 
SNS discussions, track discussions that relate to a particular policy or policy announcement, 
identify clusters of opinion, locate individual opinion-formers who might be well-placed to 
lead a further debate, and track popular sentiment as a discussion or political event unfolds. It 
will reflect the kinds of services already used for commercial brand management, but SNS 
management and analysis will be tailored specifically to support the working practices and 
analytics requirements of policy-makers: for example we are investigating how SNS analysis 
can be linked to individual parliamentary constituencies. 
Handling the Data 
The  volumes  of  data  involved  in  SNS  analysis  can  be  vast.  Depending  on  the  scale  of 
consultation to be undertaken, it may be necessary to harvest and analyse tens of thousands of 
natural language social network messages. The infrastructure required to store and process 
this amount of data is significant, with associated costs: even with the economies of scale of 
commercial brand management, the leading SNS analytics packages charge subscription fees 
of several hundred dollars per month. If cash-strapped public sector organisations are to adopt 
the WeGov toolkit it must be as cheap to access as possible. Therefore when the WeGov 
project  was  formulated,  rather  than  basing  our  software  architecture  around  in-house 
infrastructure, it was our intention to exploit emerging Cloud Computing services. Cloud 
Computing offers a flexible, scalable model for on-demand provision of data processing and 
storage resource. Although Cloud Computing can be deployed as a private resource within a 
single  organisation,  the  term  more  commonly  refers  to  outsourced  computing  resource 
provided  on  a  commercial  basis  by  third-party  organisations.  As  such,  it  represents  an 
attractive alternative to costly up-front purchase of IT infrastructure that might only rarely be 
used  to  its  full  capacity.  However,  the  success  of  any  eParticipation  activity  is  heavily 
dependent on user perception. Policy-makers must have confidence that deploying the toolkit   Page 3 
 
 
 
 
will not provoke a popular backlash or breach privacy or data protection legislation or ethical 
guidelines. In the following discussion, we describe issues that led us to conclude it was not 
currently practical to use third-party Cloud Computing as the basis of our own toolkit; we 
believe consideration of these issues is essential for anyone seeking to deploy eParticipation 
applications on ‘the Cloud’.   
Governmental and Media Concerns over Cloud 
In  December  2009,  at  the  end  of  the  year  in  which  cloud  computing  really  took  off  in 
business, Social Computing Journal predicted 2010 would be the year “Cloud computing will 
go big” for eGovernment[3]. Since then, serious concerns have been raised in the IT and 
popular press regarding the use of commercial Cloud Computing services to handle personal 
or  sensitive  data[4][5][6].  Amid  calls  from  European  leaders  for  a  global  data  protection 
law[7], the European Network and Information Agency (ENISA) has warned government 
agencies  against  deploying  applications  that  process  sensitive  data  to  external  Cloud 
providers[8]. In the UK, the charitable fundraising sector, which (like eParticipation) involves 
profiling large numbers of private individuals, has also cautioned against using commercial 
Cloud systems[9]. Though the UK Government has announced the establishment of a ‘G-
Cloud’ to host a wide range of Government services, it has stated this will be a private, closed 
facility,  hosted  within  the  UK.  The  Australian  government  has  delayed  its  timetable  for 
moving services to public Cloud computing, with the movement of private citizens’ data 
taking place last of all, and not for several years[10]. So what is the basis of reported concerns 
regarding  Cloud  Computing?  The  ENISA  analysis  indicated  seven  areas  of  risk:  loss  of 
governance,  provider  lock-in,  isolation  failure,  compliance,  management  interface 
compromise, data protection and insecure or incomplete data deletion. Several of these have 
been echoed by business leaders and IT consultants: the IT Governance Institute reported 
almost half of the C-level executives they surveyed cited data privacy worries[11], and the 
Cloud Security Alliance has highlighted the lack of a clear regulatory environment for Cloud 
Computing providers[12]. These challenges are exacerbated when Cloud providers are located 
in  different  jurisdictions  to  their  customers,  or  move  data  between  jurisdictions  without 
notice. 
The Legal and Ethical Issues inherent in eParticipation 
Against this background of press and governmental anxiety, the University of Southampton’s 
internet law group, ILAWS, investigated the legal and ethical issues inherent in an SNS-based 
eParticipation  application,  including  an  assessment  of  their  implications  for  Cloud 
deployment. Mindful of the need that an eParticipation application is seen and believed to 
comply with ethical and legal best practice, its recommendation was to exercise caution. The 
analysis focussed on three potential problem areas - data protection and privacy, copyright 
and intellectual property, and defamation – but as the ENISA report has already indicated, it 
was in the area of data protection and privacy where issues particularly relevant to Cloud 
Computing were identified.  
At first glance, privacy might not seem to be a major consideration when dealing with SNS 
postings. The primary purpose of a SNS is, after all, facilitating sharing of messages, content 
or status. Indeed this view was reinforced by a recent ruling of the UK’s Press Complaints 
Commission (PCC), widely reported in the UK and international press. The PCC was asked Page 4   
 
 
 
by the complainant to consider the right of a newspaper to republish their Twitter posts. The 
PCC  ruled  that  Twitter  posts  should  be  considered  public,  but  this  ruling  was,  logically 
enough, made in response to a complaint – the individual concerned was angered that their 
Tweets  were  republished  by  a  mass-circulation  newspaper  without  their  permission. 
Ironically, the complainant was a UK Government civil servant, who had previously blogged 
in favour of government using SNSs to engage with the public[13], but clearly it would be 
catastrophic for an eParticipation application to become mired in a similar controversy. This 
reflects  the  complex  attitudes  to  privacy  that  surround  what  ostensibly  is  a  very  public 
medium. Privacy expectations vary between SNS platforms, and between different user areas 
of the same platform - consider, for example, the difference between a post by a citizen on a 
commercial organisation’s public Facebook wall, and a post to their own private wall by one 
of their Facebook friends. In fact ILAWS indicated three reasons why SNS posts are not 
without privacy concerns: 
•  Lack of awareness by SNS users of how privacy controls operate, particularly exacerbated 
when default privacy settings are changed by the SNS after its launch, as happened with 
Facebook in 2009[14];  
•  The legal and ethical sensitivity of political opinions and the need for any eParticipation 
tool to adopt a defensive legal position;  
•  Social  expectation,  for  example  where  the  use  of  pseudonym  usernames  indicates  an 
expectation of, or a desire for anonymity. 
 
The implication of this assessment is that while information might be sourced from publicly-
accessible areas of an SNS, the eParticipation application should handle the information as if 
it  were  private  and  confidential.  Repositories  of  harvested  SNS  posts  and  profiles,  the 
channels through which the content is moved between different software components of the 
eParticipation  application,  and  the  individual  software  components  themselves,  must  all 
therefore be operated securely and in accordance with data protection legislation, discussed 
next. 
In the European Economic Area (EEA), the EC Data Protection Directive applies regardless 
of whether the user has an expectation of privacy; its scope is personal data, and this is simply 
data  that  “relates  to  an  identified  or  identifiable  natural  person”.  The  Data  Protection 
Directive  prohibits  processing  of  personal  data  except  when  specific  conditions  are  met 
relating  to  transparency,  legitimate  purpose  and  proportionality.  The  obligations  are 
particularly stringent for sensitive personal data, i.e. that revealing an individual’s racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or containing information 
about their health or sex life. The political data is the very stuff that policy-makers seek to 
understand, but the policy-maker might find themselves handling sensitive personal data even 
where it is not explicitly sought; an individual’s SNS username, for example, might strongly 
indicate their ethnicity.  
Due to differences in the transposition of EC directives into national law, even within the 
European Union, the precise legal situation varies from one member state to another. The 
European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  has  recommended  replacement  of  the  current  Data 
Protection Directive with a self-executing Regulation that would be immediately enforceable 
across all member states [15], but it is not yet clear if and when this will happen. In the 
meantime, we have based our analysis on the Directive as currently transposed into UK law,   Page 5 
 
 
 
 
as  the  UK  Data  Protection  Act  1998.  This  contains  eight  data  protection  principles,  in 
summary: 
•  Fair and lawful processing 
•  Personal data obtained for fair and lawful purposes 
•  Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose(s) for 
which they are processed 
•  Personal data shall be accurate and kept up-to-date 
•  Personal data processed for any purpose shall not be kept longer than is necessary for that 
purpose 
•  Processing in accordance with the data subjects’ rights 
•  Implementation  of  adequate  security  measures,  including  against  accidental  loss  of  or 
damage to personal data 
•  Transfer  of  personal  data  outside  the  EEA  prohibited  unless  the  destination  country 
ensures adequate protection of rights of data subjects in relation to processing of personal 
data 
We can see that consequent on data protection legislation are obligations not only to maintain 
data security, but also relating to data integrity, retention and movement. It is necessary to 
ensure that any harvested SNS profiles are up-to-date, and that old versions do not linger in 
storage.  Profiles  and  messages  must  only  be  retained  for  as  long  as  is  necessary  for  the 
specific eParticipation exercise for which they were harvested, which means there needs to be 
an effective mechanism to irreversibly delete this data as soon as it is no longer required. And 
the physical location of the data must be known at all times, whether it is being actively 
processed, or sitting in storage. With whom do these obligations lie, and how do they impact 
on the viability of using third-party Cloud computing? 
The Challenges for Cloud 
Let us first consider the issue of responsibility. Ethically, it is clear-cut. The policy-maker 
must take responsibility for the security and proper treatment of the data they harvest. It is 
essential that policy-makers retain goodwill and confidence of citizens (and in the UK at least, 
it is front-page news when government is careless with citizens’ personal data). The policy 
maker will also be stimulating the debate in many cases, actively encouraging the posts that 
they subsequently harvest. In order to understand with whom legal responsibility for meeting 
data protection requirements lies, it is necessary to examine the distinction between Data 
Controller and Data Processor, as different data protection obligations are placed on each 
role under European Law. According to the EC Data Protection Directive, the Data Controller 
is defined as “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which 
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of processing personal 
data”. Data Processing is defined much more broadly, as “any operation or set of operations 
which  is  performed  upon  personal  data  whether  or  not  by  automatic  means,  such  as 
collection, recording, organisation, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination,  blocking,  erasure  or  destruction”.  SNS  providers  themselves  are  data 
controllers as they determine purposes and means of processing of information published and 
exchanged by their users. On the other hand, the eParticipation application would itself be Page 6   
 
 
 
considered a data processor, not a data controller; here the responsibilities of data controller 
would lie with the policy-maker using the eParticipation application to post to and mine 
SNSs. 
Ethically and in law it would therefore be the responsibility of the policy-maker to ensure that 
the Cloud provider has suitable measures in place to meet the requirements of privacy and 
data  protection  legislation  and  that  these  are  included  in  the  contract  with  the  provider. 
Unfortunately  many  Cloud  providers  disclaim  responsibility,  stating  that  it  is  up  to  the 
customer  to  meet  these  requirements.  We  have  already  discussed  the  security  concerns 
surrounding  Cloud  computing.  Hitachi  Data  Systems’  CTO  Security  and  Privacy,  Eric 
Hibbard, has referred to “data droppings” in the Cloud, saying “data retention and media 
sanitization are unpredictable” [17]. This is counter to the data protection requirement that 
data  not  be  kept  for  longer  than  necessary.  Hibbard  also  stated  that  “the  integrity  and 
authenticity of data [held in the Cloud] may be questionable” – this too is counter to one of 
the tenets of data protection, that data shall be accurate and up-to-date. The mantra of  ‘in the 
Cloud’ suggests  we shouldn’t care where our processing or storage takes place, but data 
protection regulations applicable to SNS content mean the opposite is true – it is vital to know 
in which territory and jurisdiction data processing and storage are located. Unless there is a 
contractual guarantee that the cloud provider will not transfer data they receive to another 
cloud service outside the EEA, the policy-maker may find themselves unwittingly in breach 
of data protection legislation even when having contracted an EEA service provider. We note 
that  the  EC’s  Safe  Harbour  programme  does  permit  export  of  personal  data  to  the  US 
provided the processor to which it is exported has Safe Harbour status, but organisations are 
permitted to self-certify and self-regulate their compliance – as a result, the German data 
protection authorities advise that certification cannot be relied on [18]. With Cloud service 
providers “sometimes hesitant about disclosing locations or sub-contractors” [19], again it 
would be difficult for policy-makers to be sure they were Data Protection compliant. 
Why Anonimisation isn’t the answer 
If  we  cannot  confidently  entrust  unprocessed  sensitive  data  to  Cloud  services,  perhaps 
anonymisation of citizens’ SNS profiles and messages might offer a solution: if these profiles 
and messages could be modified such that the individuals to whom they related were no 
longer “identified” or “identifiable”, they would no longer be considered personal data under 
the terms of the Data Protection Directive. We have considered the viability of anonymisation 
of SNS data at a private dedicated server prior to uploading it to a third-party Cloud service 
for further processing  and storage. Unfortunately  there are several reasons why we don’t 
believe this to be practical: 
•  Removing information will severely reduce the value of the information – in many cases, 
rendering it useless.  
•  It extremely difficult to determine what needs to be deleted to ensure that SNS data is 
guaranteed to be not personal. For example, the data may contain arbitrary unstructured 
information  that  contains  personal  information.  Therefore  it  is  almost  impossible  to 
guarantee that the SNS data is not personal. 
•  Anonymisation  cannot  be  done  at  the  SNS  sites  themselves  as  SNSs  do  not  offer 
anonymised data via their APIs, so the anonymisation service itself would be subject to all 
the legal and ethical concerns we have outlined in this paper.    Page 7 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, we cannot guarantee that aggregation of multiple seemingly innocuous pieces of 
information will not result in a combined profile from which a single individual is clearly 
identifiable. Many might hold strong opinions on nuclear power or Middle East policy, and 
tens of people might care about the siting of a particular mobile phone mast, but it isn’t too 
difficult to imagine that one individual in a community is known for being vocal on all three 
issues. Indeed networked data of this kind is notoriously difficult to anonymise effectively; 
there  is  ongoing  research,  for  example  examining  the  effectiveness  of  graph  structure 
perturbation [20] (a technique that results in information loss), but Microsoft’s Chief Privacy 
Advisor  for  EMEA,  Caspar  Bowden,  is  among  those  who  have  argued  that  effective 
anonymisation of ‘networked’ information simply isn’t possible given advances in Computer 
Science [21]. Although beyond the scope of both this paper and our work in the WeGov 
project, perhaps a more viable alternative is selective encryption of personal data in such a 
way that it can still be processed remotely [21]. 
Recommendations to Cloud Providers 
On  the  basis  of  our  analysis,  we  make  the  following  recommendations  to  Cloud  service 
providers,  which  we  believe  will  allow  policy-makers  and  others  dealing  with  sensitive 
personal data to use third-party Cloud processing and storage with greater confidence: 
•  Conduct  and  make  public  the  results  of  independent  security  and  data  protection 
audits; 
•  Provide clear checklists of data protection law compliance; 
•  Engage with the EC and other regulatory bodies to develop a common regulatory 
framework for Cloud service provision that will include those operators outside the 
EEA and working under Safe Harbour status; 
•  Provide details of their data deletion policies, including maximum time guarantees 
between the customer requesting deletion of an item of data and all copies of that data 
being deleted irretrievably and verifiably; 
•  Clearly specify the physical locations and jurisdictions of all processing and storage 
within their service level agreements; 
•  Explicitly  detail  any  sub-contracting  arrangements  that  entail  customer  data  being 
moved to other service providers; 
•  Allow Cloud service customers to opt-out of any subcontracting arrangements, even if 
this means charging a financial premium for a geo-constrained service. 
 
Conclusions 
So where does this leave our work with the WeGov toolkit, and what is our advice to others 
considering  developing  SNS-based  eParticipation  applications  or  looking  to  use  Cloud 
technology to support other eParticipation activities? We have determined we cannot deploy 
the WeGov toolkit on third-party Cloud Computing services (as they are currently defined as 
cheap,  commodity,  “locationless”  services);  we  are  not  confident  that  any  such  service 
currently addresses the legal and ethical issues identified in this paper, so in the short term 
will instead employ our own servers and storage. Having adopted a modular ‘software-as-a-
service’  architecture, it  will be relatively straightforward to move CPU- or storage-heavy Page 8   
 
 
 
processes to a third-party Cloud service if and when a provider emerges that complies with 
the recommendations made above. What is also clear is that data protection compliance is not 
cheap, so the commodity pricing of existing Cloud processing services will not apply with a 
dedicated data protection compliant hosting provider. In the meantime, those policy-makers 
with sufficient resources might wish to follow the example of the UK Government, and make 
use  of  private,  in-house  Cloud  capability  to  host  their  eParticipation  applications  or 
alternatively seek dedicated relationships with external, private, data protection compliant, 
hosting companies despite the cost overhead that this involves. 
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